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I. Introduction
Since 2011, the conflict in Syria, continued instability in Afghanistan, and
ongoing civil strife and international struggle in many parts of the world have
contributed to the massive upheaval of individuals from their homes and their
countries of origin.1 Approximately one in one hundred individuals around the
globe are either internally or externally displaced.2 The current geopolitical reality
of large-scale human displacement has led the United Nations to conclude that
the world is in the midst of a global refugee crisis.3 As noted by António Guterres,
former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “We are witnessing a paradigm
change, an unchecked slide into an era in which the scale of global forced
displacement as well as the response required is now clearly dwarfing anything
seen before.”4
In bearing its burden in the global refugee crisis, the United States has accepted
large numbers of these refugees through the federal Refugee Admissions Program
(RAP).5 Since 1975, the United States has welcomed over 3 million refugees
inside its borders, allowing these individuals to find safety from persecution and
giving them the opportunity to begin their lives again.6
Within the United States, every state participates in the resettlement of
refugees, except for Wyoming, which has never been a formal participant in
the national refugee resettlement program.7 For reasons discussed in this article,
Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015, UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency, 3
(2016), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.
html (showing that 54% of the world’s refugees come from Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia)
[hereinafter Global Trends 2015]; International Crisis Group, What’s Driving the Global Refugee
Crisis? (last updated Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/what-s-driving-globalrefugee-crisis.
1

Phillip Connor & Jens Manuel Krogstad, Key Facts About the World’s Refugees, Pew
Res. Center (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/05/key-facts-aboutthe-worlds-refugees/.
2

Global Trends 2015, supra note 2 (finding that “By end-2014, 59.5 million individuals were
forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or human
rights violations.”).
3

4

Id. at 3.

See U.S. Dep’t.
state.gov/j/prm/ra/.
5

6

of

State, Refugee Admissions (last visited Apr. 15, 2017) https://www.

Id.

Justin Fisk, State’s Role in Refugee Resettlement, The Current State E-Newsl., Jan. 2017,
http://www.csg.org/pubs/capitolideas/enews/cs41_2.aspx.
7
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refugees still find their way to Wyoming, but there is no formal structure in
place to affirmatively welcome refugees to the State.8 Simply put: the State of
Wyoming is one in fifty.9 Given the State’s exceptionalism in this regard and in light
of the global refugee crisis, the question then arises: should Wyoming join the
federal refugee resettlement program or must Wyoming join the federal refugee
resettlement program? From a legal perspective, could the federal government
require Wyoming to bear its proportionate burden in the national refugee
resettlement program and engage in resettlement in the State?
This article explores Wyoming’s role in the global refugee crisis. Part II
describes the legal framework, both international and domestic, that creates the
multi-layered refugee and asylum regime.10 Part III examines how the refugee
resettlement program works in practice—from identification of refugees abroad
to resettlement in specific communities within the United States.11 Building on
this legal and procedural foundation, the article moves to a Wyoming-specific
analysis. Part IV describes the Wyoming refugee resettlement discussion to date,
including efforts by local advocates to bring refugees to the State and the resistance
that has followed.12
Part V builds on the work of immigration scholar Stella Elias, who has written
comprehensively on state responses to refugee resettlement and introduced
the term refugee federalism to describe the interactions of state and federal
government in the refugee admissions and resettlement context.13 Using a refugee
federalism theoretical framework,14 Part V brings a Wyoming specific analysis to
the scholarship in this area and contextualizes Wyoming’s role in an emerging
anti-refugee narrative that has been characterized, in part, by states’ failed efforts
to limit refugee resettlement.15 Part V poses the Wyoming-specific questions of
whether the federal government would have legal authority to require Wyoming
to accept refugees, or, alternatively, whether Wyoming might, as Elias suggests,
use the existing federalism framework to affirmatively welcome refugees within
its borders.16 The article concludes by suggesting that Wyoming is at a crossroads
8

See id.

9

Id.

10

See infra notes 18 –146 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 147–175 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 175 –232 and accompanying text.

Stella Burch Elias, The Perils and Possibilities of Refugee Federalism, 66 Am. U. L. Rev. 353,
358 (2016).
13

14
See generally Steve Vladeck, Three Thoughts on Refugee Resettlement Federalism, Lawfare
B log (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/three-thoughts-refugee-resettlementfederalism; Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, The New Immigration
Federalism 12 (2015).
15

See infra notes 233–310 and accompanying text.

16

Elias, supra note 14 at 407–12; see also infra notes 233–310 and accompanying text.
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in the refugee resettlement debate. Given the possibilities for economic growth,
demographic diversity, and service provision to refugees and asylees already within
the state, the article recommends that it would be in the State’s best interest to
position itself as a willing participant in the federal refugee resettlement program.

II. Responding to the Global Refugee Crisis:
A Multi-Leveled Regulatory Regime
Mulitple levels of law and regulations define the United States’ refugee
resettlement regime. At the international level, the United States has indicated an
obligation to provide a certain standard of treatment to those fleeing persecution.17
It has also engaged with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
to receive referrals for refugee resettlement.18 At the federal level, Congress has
codified the United States’ international obligations and created legal procedures
that offer safe-haven to those who are displaced from their country of origin
on account of persecution.19 From an enforcement perspective, Congress also
delegated authority to the President to restrict the admission of certain classes of
non-citizens when it is in the national interest.20 In operationalizing this statutory
scheme, federal agencies have created a menu of programs for the engagement of
sub-national state actors in the process refugee resettlement in local communities.21
This section provides an overview of these varying levels of regulation, which
create the normative legal framework underlying the global refugee crisis and the
refugee resettlement debate.

A. The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees:
A Collective International Approach to the Refugee Problem
The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee
Convention) is the primary instrument governing the treatment of refugees
internationally.22 The Refugee Convention reflects the principle that rather than
being the problem of any one country which might happen to find refugees
within its borders, “the refugee problem is a matter of concern to the international
community and must be addressed in the context of international cooperation
17
See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
[hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
18

8 U.S.C. §§ 1521–1524 (2012).

See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (defines refugee within Immigration and Nationality
Act); 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (establishes Office of Refugee Resettlement); Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L.
96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Refugee Act] (outlines changes to the Immigration
and Nationality Act codifying refugee obligations).
19

20

8 U.S.C. § 1182(f ) (2012).

21

See 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(2)(B).

22

See Refugee Convention, supra note 18.
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and burden-sharing.”23 To that end, members of the United Nations drafted the
Refugee Convention as a collective problem-sharing solution in response to the
large numbers of refugees created by the Second World War.24
At the time it was drafted, the Refugee Convention was limited in time and
scope. It was initially intended only to protect those individuals that had become
refugees prior to, and as a result of, events taking place before January 1, 1951.25
As members of the international community soon realized, however, the problem
of displaced persons was not a phenomenon limited to the events precipitated
by the Second World War. Refugees would come to permanently define the
international landscape and require international cooperation.26 Accordingly, the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees27 (Optional Protocol) expanded
the temporal scope of the Refugee Convention and made it the “universal
international instrument for the protection of refugees.”28 At the time of writing,
146 nations have ratified the Refugee Convention and its corresponding Optional
Protocol, including the United States.29
The Refugee Convention sets forth the definition of a refugee as anyone who,
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of
the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality

Paul Weis, The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux Préparatoires Analysed
Commentary by Dr Paul Weis 4 (1995), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/travaux/
4ca34be29/refugee-convention-1951-travaux-preparatoires-analysed-commentary-dr-paul.html.
23

with a

24

Id.

Refugee Convention, supra note 18, art. 1(A)(1); see also UNHCR, Convention
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 2, n.2 (2010), http://www.unhcr.org/
en-us/3b66c2aa10 (“The Convention enabled States to make a declaration when becoming party,
according to which the words ‘events occurring before 1 January 1951’ are understood to mean
‘events occurring in Europe’ prior to that date.”).
25

and

Weis, supra note 24, at 4; see also Refugee Convention, supra note 18, recommendation D
(“[the Conference] recommends that Governments continue to receive refugees in their territories
and that they act in concert in a true spirit of international cooperation in order that these refugees
may find asylum and the possibility of resettlement.”).
26

27
Optional Protocol, supra note 18, at 2, (Jan. 31, 1967) (On Nov. 1, 1968, the United
States became a party to the Optional Protocol, which incorporates the provisions of the
Refugee Convention).
28

Weis, supra note 24, at 4.

UNHCR, States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
1967 Protocol (April 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/3b73b0d63/
states-parties-1951-convention-its-1967-protocol.html.
29

and the
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and being outside the country of his former habitual residence
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to it.30
The definition of a refugee rests on three primary guiding principles under
the Refugee Convention: “non-discrimination, non-penalization and nonrefoulement.”31 With respect to non-discrimination, the Refugee Convention states
that its provisions are to be applied “without discrimination as to race, religion
or country of origin.”32 The non-penalization provisions recognize that genuine
refugees often must transgress the immigration laws of the receiving country
in order to enter and apply for refugee status.33 Finally, and most importantly,
the Refugee Convention reflects the customary international legal norm of nonrefoulement, which prevents signatories and non-signatories alike from returning
a refugee to a country where his or her life or freedom would be threatened.34
Beyond its guiding principles, the Refugee Convention provides a number of
additional protections to those who meet its definition of a refugee. In particular,
the Refugee Convention mandates that host governments must protect freedom of
religion, freedom of association, and freedom to seek and engage in employment
for refugees.35 Moreover, state parties must provide access to courts, certain
housing resources, public education, certain public benefits, and identity and
travel documentation.36 In mandating these protections and services, the Refugee
Convention’s aims are to encourage a refugee’s integration into her new country
of permanent residence and provide refugees with the opportunity to create a
meaningful life, complete with the same human rights protections available to
citizens and nationals.37

30

Refugee Convention, supra note 18, art. 1(A)(2).

UNHCR, Introductory Note: Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees 3, (2010), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10 [hereinafter Introductory Note].
31

32

Refugee Convention, supra note 18, art. 3.

Id., art. 31(1) (stating that “[t]he Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account
of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life
or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without
authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good
cause for their illegal entry or presence.”)
33

Refugee Convention, supra note 18, art. 33; see also UNHCR, Convention and Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 26, at 3, 4; Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951
Refugee Convention, 9 Harv. Hum. Rights. J. 229, 252 (1996) (“The most enduring contribution
of the Convention is its elevation of nonrefoulement [sic] to the status of an obligatory norm.”).
34

35

Refugee Convention, supra note 18, arts. 4, 15, 17.

36

Refugee Convention, supra note 18, arts. 16, 21, 22–24, 27–28.

37

See Introductory Note, supra note 32, at 3.
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B. The Immigration and Nationality Act and its Delegated Authority:
Translating International Obligations into Domestic Procedures
The United States became a party to the Refugee Convention in 1968.38
However, prior to acceding to obligations internationally, Congress had shown
a concern for refugees and displaced persons through several varied pieces of
domestic legislation. These included the Displaced Persons Act of 1948,39 which
responded to the refugee crisis created by World War II,40 the Immigration and
Nationality Act Amendments of 1965,41 which established a permanent statutory
basis for refugee admission,42 and through an ad hoc Refugee Task Force in 1975,
which resettled hundreds of thousands non-citizens from Southeast Asia following
the Vietnam War.43 Yet, as scholars have noted, despite the many attempts to
respond to the varying refugee flows and populations in the post-World War II
period, “the United States . . . struggled to define its proper role in coping with
the refugee problem.”44
Finally in 1980, Congress created the Refugee Act to create a “comprehensive,
objective and fair refugee and asylum policy.”45 The Refugee Act adopted the
definition of a refugee from the Refugee Convention,46 and provided the legal
framework for the resettlement of refugees from abroad.47 In addition, it created
a procedure whereby individuals physically present inside the United States could
apply for asylum and have their applications adjudicated on a “systematic and
equitable basis.”48 Each of these statutory provisions, as well as the delegation

38

Optional Protocol, supra note 18, at 2.

39

Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1010 (1948).

See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the
Refugee Act of 1980, 19 San Diego L. Rev. 9, 13 (1981) (noting that “[t]he Act provided sanctuary
only for certain displaced, forced laborers from states conquered by Germany and for certain
refugees who qualified under the United Nations (UN) refugee standards, particularly those who
had fled Nazi or Fascist persecution and those fleeing Soviet persecution.”).
40

Immigration and Nationality Act, amendments, Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965)
[hereinafter 1965 Amendments].
41

Doris Meissner, Thirty Years of the Refugee Act of 1980, 15 eJournal USA 8, https://
americancenterjapan.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/EJ-refugees-0710.pdf (last visited Apr.
19, 2017).
42

History of The U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program, Refugee Council USA, http://www.
rcusa.org/history/ (last visited Apr.15, 2017).
43

44

Anker & Posner, supra note 41, at 10.

45

See Anker & Posner, supra note 41, at 89.

Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012) (defines refugee within Immigration and
Nationality Act) with Refugee Convention, supra note 18, art. 1(A)(2).
46

47

Anker & Posner, supra note 41, at 11.

48

Id. at 11–12.
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of authority to the executive to exclude certain classes of non-citizens49 will be
explored in turn.

1. Domestic Asylum Adjudication: Meeting the Definition of a Refugee
As noted above, Congress adopted an almost identical definition of refugee
from the Refugee Convention.50 The definition of a refugee under the Immigrat
ion and Nationality Act provides that:
The term “refugee” means . . . any person who is outside any
country of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable
or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.51
Along with establishing this definition, Congress created a process whereby
individuals who are already physically present in the United States can prove they
meet the definition of a refugee by filing an application for asylum with the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services, a branch of the Department of
Homeland Security.52 Alternatively, an applicant for asylum can assert protection
under the Refugee Act as a defense to deportation or removal from the United
States before the Executive Office for Immigration Review, otherwise known as
the Immigration Court.53
To prevail on a claim for asylum, a non-citizen must prove either that he
or she suffered past persecution or that he or she has a well-founded fear of
future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group.54 The U.S. Supreme Court has held

49

8 U.S.C. § 1182(f ) (2012).

Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012) (defines refugee within Immigration and
Nationality Act) with Refugee Convention, supra note 18, art. 1(A)(2).
50

51

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).

8 U.S.C. § 1158(1) (2012) (“Any alien who is physically present in the United States or
who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an
alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United
States waters), irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum . . . .”); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.3,
1208.3; see also Regina Germain, Seeking Refuge: The U.S. Asylum Process, 35 Colo. Law. 71, 74
(2006) (citing Regina Germain, AILA’s Asylum Primer: A Practical Guide to U.S. Asylum
Law and Procedure 77-100 (4th ed. 2005)) (describing the administrative process of applying
for asylum).
52

53

See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.1 (2017).

54

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (2017).
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that a well-founded fear of persecution equates to at least a ten percent chance
that the applicant will face persecution upon return to her country of origin.55
Persecution itself has no precise definition under the Refugee Act, although over
time, case law has defined what does and does not rise to the level of persecution.56
The persecution must bear a nexus to one of the five protected grounds,57 with
the “particular social group” ground expanding continually to create cognizable
claims in the areas of gender, family, and sexual orientation-motivated harms.58
In addition to meeting the definition of a refugee, an applicant for asylum
must also prove that she is not subject to one of the statutory bars to asylum.
These include failing to file for asylum within one year of arrival in the United
States, being firmly resettled in a third country prior to arrival in the United
States, having persecuted others, having committed a particularly serious crime,
or otherwise being a threat to the safety and security of the United States.59 In
some instances, the United States has entered Safe Third Country Agreements
with other nations that require the asylum applicant to apply for asylum in the
first country of arrival.60
In 2015, the United States immigration agency determined that 26,124
non-citizens met the definition of a refugee and warranted a grant asylum.61 This
number does not reflect the accompanying, or following to join, family members
that come to the United States after an immediate family member has been
granted asylum,62 which totaled an additional 7,116 admissions in 2015.63 Once
a non-citizen has been granted asylum, they become an asylee. Asylees can access
financial and other resources through the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR)

55

INS. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).

See Regina Germain, Seeking Refuge: The U.S. Asylum Process, 35 Colo. Law. 71, 73 (2006)
(quoting Matter of Kasinga, 21 Dec. 357 (BIA 1996)) (“The BIA has defined ‘persecution’ as the
‘infliction of harm or suffering by a government, or persons a government is unable or unwilling to
control, to overcome a characteristic of the victim.’”).
56

57

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012).

See, e.g., Blaine Bookey, Symposium: The Global Struggle for Women’s Equality: Gender-Based
Asylum Post-Matter of A-R-C-G-: Evolving Standards and Fair Application of the Law, 22 Sw. J. Int’l
L. 1, 2, 5 (2016) (citing Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 Dec. 388, 392 (BIA 2014)) (finding that “married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” constitutes a cognizable particular
social group sufficient for asylum).
58

59

8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2) (2012).

Id.; see, e.g., Agreement for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from
Nationals of Third Countries, U.S.-Canada, Dec. 5, 2002, T.I.A.S. 04-1229.
60

Nadwa Mossaad, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Annual Flow Report, Refugees and
Asylees: 2015 1 (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refugees_Asylees_
2015.pdf.
61

62

8 C.F.R. § 208.21 (2017) (addressing “Admission of the asylee’s spouse and children”).

63

Mossaad, supra note 62, at 7.
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because they have proven that they meet the definition of a refugee under the
Immigration and Nationality Act.64 However, an asylee’s access to ORR assistance
requires that a program be in place in the asylee’s state of residence, and for
individuals who are granted asylum while living in Wyoming, this means that
such assistance is not available.65
It is important to note that during the asylum application process and at any
time thereafter, asylum applicants and asylees are free to move about the country.
There is no regulation or restriction on an asylum applicant’s or asylee’s freedom
of movement.66 In fact, the Refugee Convention requires that, once granted
asylum, the United States must guarantee refugees or asylees “the right to choose
their place of residence and to move freely within its territory . . . .”67 Thus, an
applicant or asylee might arrive in one state and subsequently move freely between
states at any point during the application process or after asylum is granted. Such
movement does not require the consent of the state or federal government and
does not depend on whether a federal refugee resettlement program exists in the
receiving jurisdiction.68
Several examples illustrate this process. First, an applicant for asylum might
arrive at Denver International Airport, travel to Wyoming, apply for asylum while
living in Wyoming, and become a Convention-defined refugee, i.e. an aslyee, in
Wyoming. Alternatively, a non-citizen might be granted asylum while living in
Nebraska, but, while holding asylee status, choose to live in Wyoming, creating
yet another situation where someone who fits the Refugee Convention definition
of a refugee becomes a Wyoming resident. In each of these instances, the asylees
would be eligible for benefits that, in the presence of a resettlement program,
the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement would provide.69 These are just two
examples of how asylees who meet the definition of a refugee might find their
way to Wyoming even in the absence of an affirmative state-sponsored refugee
resettlement program.70

64

See 45 C.F.R. §§ 400.45– 400.319 (2017).

Asylee Eligibility for Assistance and Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement (Jul, 12,
2012), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/asylee-eligibility-for-assistance-and-services.
65

66
See 8 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (2012) (requiring that aliens notify the Department of Homeland
Security of a change of address within ten days from the date of such change but placing no
restrictions on an alien’s freedom of movement between states and within the United States).
67

Refugee Convention, supra note 18, art. 26.

68

See 8 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (2012).

69

8 C.F.R. § 400.62 (2017).

The author was unable to obtain statistics representing how many refugees are present in
Wyoming under these modes of arrival.
70
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2. Overseas Refugee Resettlement: A Statutory Basis
Unlike asylum, the process of domestic refugee resettlement begins outside
of the United States. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), in cooperation with national governments, has authority for making
initial refugee status determinations.71 However, in order for a displaced person
to be identified as a candidate for resettlement in a third country, the UNHCR
must determine that the individual meets the definition of a refugee under
the Refugee Convention.72 As noted above, the Refugee Convention’s refugee
definition closely mirrors that of the Immigration and Nationality Act.73 This
determination requires that UNHCR officials conduct an extensive interview of
displaced persons to conclude whether the facts of the person’s case demonstrate
that he or she has faced past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future
persecution based on one of the protected grounds.74
Once a displaced person has been identified as a refugee, United Nations
and national officials then undertake the work of determining which durable
solution presents the refugee with the opportunity to live “in dignity and peace.”75
Durable solutions take three forms: (1) voluntary repatriation, (2) integration, and
(3) resettlement.76 Voluntary repatriation is the act by which the refugee decides
that it is safe for her to return to her country of origin and then physically returns
home.77 Integration is the process by which the refugee finds a “home in the
country of asylum and integrat[es] into the local community . . . .”78 Integration is

UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees
4 –5(rev. 1992) [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook].
71

under the

72
Id. ¶ 29 ( “Determination of refugee status is a process which takes place in two stages.
Firstly, it is necessary to ascertain the relevant facts of the case. Secondly, the definitions in the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol have to be applied to the facts thus ascertained.”).
73
Compare Refugee Convention, supra note 18, art. 1(A)(2), with 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)
(42) (2012).
74
UNHCR Handbook, supra note 72, Section B2; see also Refugee Status Determination,
UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/refugee-status-determination.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2017).
75
Solutions, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/solutions.html (last visited Apr. 15,
2017). See also Paul Weis, supra note 24, at 4 (“International cooperation in dealing with refugee
problems presupposes collective action by governments in working out appropriate durable solutions
for refugees.”); UNHCR, Global Report 2006, Finding Durable Solutions, http://www.unhcr.
org/4a2fd4fc6.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2017).

UNHCR, Solutions for Refugees, 186 (2016), http://www.unhcr.org/50a4c17f9.pdf
(last visited May 3, 2017) [hereinafter Solutions for Refugees].
76

See UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection 4 (1996), http://
www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3bfe68d32.pdf (defining voluntary repatriation as the process of
“enabling a refugee to exercise the right to return home in safety and with dignity.”).
77

Local Integration, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/local-integration-49c3646c101.
html (last visited Apr. 15, 2017).
78
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rare, as many highly-affected host countries often lack educational and economic
opportunity or the political will to support displaced populations with an offer of
permanent residence.79
Finally, resettlement in a third country is an option for those refugees for
whom voluntary repatriation or integration is not possible.80As defined by
UNHCR, “[r]esettlement is the transfer of refugees from an asylum country to
another State that has agreed to admit them and ultimately grant them permanent
settlement.”81 Of the over 15 million refugees encountered by the UNHCR
around the world by the end of 2015, less than one percent of those refugees were
resettled in third countries.82
The United States participates in the UNHCR’s resettlement program and
has enacted legislative provisions, largely through the 1980 Refugee Act, to guide
its acceptance of overseas refugees and the administration and funding of the
program.83 The President of the United States, in consultation with Congress,
determines the limit on the number of refugees admitted to the United States
each year, and takes into account “humanitarian concerns” and the “national
interest.”84 Once the President has determined a cap on refugee admissions for
the fiscal year, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, acting in cooperation
with the U.S. Department of State, may “admit any refugee who is not firmly
resettled in any foreign country.”85 It should be noted that neither the Refugee
Convention nor its Optional Protocol require nation-state parties to accept any
refugees from abroad.86 Yet, many countries participate in the refugee resettlement
program. The United States is the global leader in accepting refugees referred

79
Karen Jacobsen, UNHCR, New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 45,
The forgotten solution: local integration for refugees in developing countries 2 (2001),
http://www.unhcr.org/3b7d24059.pdf.
80
Resettlement, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/resettlement.html (last visited Apr.
15, 2017).
81

Id.

82

Id.

8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2012); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1522 (2012) (providing for resettlement
assistance, both monetary and through support for sponsorships, to newly arrived refugees).
83

84
8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2); see, e.g., Press Sec’y, Exec. Office of the President, Presidential
Determination on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017 (2016) , https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/28/presidential-determination-refugee-admissions-fiscalyear-2017 (establishing that “the admission of up to 110,000 refugees to the United States during
Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 is justified by humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national interest”).
85

8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1) (2012).

See Refugee Convention, supra note 18; Refugee Protocol, supra note 18; Elias, supra
note 14 at 367 (2016) (noting that neither the Convention nor its Optional Protocol obligate
signatories to accept refugees from abroad, but rather obligate parties not to refoul individuals who
are physically present within their borders and might face harm upon return).
86
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by the UNHCR.87 Canada, Australia, Norway, and the United Kingdom also
significantly participate in the resettlement of refugees within their borders.88
If the Refugee Convention does not mandate that parties participate in
the resettlement of refugees, the question naturally arises: why do countries
willingly accept refugees referred by the UNHCR? Some scholars have noted
that the United States has agreed to accept overseas refugees as a matter of
foreign policy.89 Providing safe-haven to refugees fleeing conflict might provide
the United States with a stick in the carrot-and stick balance of international
law and diplomacy. For example, for many years, the United States employed a
very generous asylum policy toward individuals fleeing Communist regimes, a
strategy central to its Cold-War policy of “damaging and ultimately defeating
Communist countries . . . .”90
In addition, refugees can provide economic benefits to receiving states. As
one commentator noted, “[r]efugees are some of the best bets for almost any
economy.”91 As another noted, “[r]efugees contribute to the economy in many
ways: as workers, entrepreneurs, innovators, taxpayers, consumers, and investors.
Their efforts can help create jobs; raise the productivity and wages of American
workers; increase capital returns; stimulate international trade and investment;
and boost innovation, enterprise, and growth.”92 Indeed, in the United States,
former Secretary of State Madeline Albright, scientist Albert Einstein, and
Google co-founder Sergey Brin were refugees.93 Coupled with a rich history of
immigration to the United States, overseas refugee admission is a staple aspect of
national immigration law and policy.

87
Resettlement Fact Sheet 2015, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/524c31a09 (last
visited Apr. 15, 2017) (showing that in 2015, the top five resettlement countries for refugee
resettlement were United States at 82,491; Canada at 22,886; Australia at 9,321; Norway at 3,806;
and the United Kingdom at 3,622).
88

Id.

See Elias, supra note 14, at 368 (noting that “during each year in which refugee admissions
peaked, the increase could be attributed to U.S. foreign policy decision or military incursions that
had a direct impact on the countries from which the refugees were seeking asylum.”).
89

90
Kathleen Newland, The Impact of U.S. Refugee Policies on U.S. Foreign Policy:
A Case of the Tail Wagging the Dog?, Threatened Peoples Threatened Borders: World
Migration and U.S. Policy 190 (Michael S. Teilbaum & Myron Weiner eds., 1995), http://
carnegieendowment.org/1995/01/01/impact-of-u.s.-refugee-policies-on-u.s.-foreign-policy-caseof-tail-wagging-dog-pub-229.

Daniel Altman, We Should All Be Competing to Take In Refugees, Foreign Policy
(Sep. 8, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/08/we-should-all-be-competing-to-take-inrefugees-europe-syria/.
91

92
Philippe Legrain, Refugees Are a Great Investment, Foreign Policy (Feb. 13, 2017), http://
foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/03/refugees-are-a-great-investment/.

Famous Refugees, Int’l Rescue Comm. (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.rescue.org/article/
famous-refugees.
93
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3. Recent Executive Orders: Suspending Refugee Admissions
Since the 2016 election, the issue of refugee settlement has become a policy
focus of the presidential administration. At the time of writing this article,
President Donald Trump has issued a series of Executives Orders (EOs) that
have called for a halt to the Refugee Admissions Program. The first Executive
Order was ostensibly issued in response to the perceived threat of non-citizen
admissions through the Refugee Admissions Program and other immigrant
and non-immigrant programs.94 President Trump issued the Executive Orders
pursuant to a Congressional delegation of authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f ),
which states that
[w]henever the President finds that the entry of . . . any class of
aliens in the United States would be detrimental to the interests
of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such
period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of . . . any
class of aliens . . . he may deem appropriate.95
Accordingly, in support of the RAP’s suspension, the EO states:
Numerous foreign-born individuals have been convicted or
implicated in terrorism-related crimes since September 11,
2001, including foreign nationals who entered the United States
after receiving visitor, student, or employment visas, or who
entered through the United States refugee resettlement program.
Deteriorating conditions in certain countries due to war, strife,
disaster, and civil unrest increase the likelihood that terrorists
will use any means possible to enter the United States. The
United States must be vigilant during the visa-issuance process
to ensure that those approved for admission do not intend to
harm Americans and that they have no ties to terrorism.96
In Section 5, the EO suspended the RAP for 120 days, during which time
government officials were instructed to review the program and its procedure
to ensure that “those approved for refugee admission do not pose a threat to
the security and welfare of the United States.”97 After a 120 day review period,
the EO indicated that the RAP would be resumed, but with a priority toward
resettling those whose claim for refugee status was based on religiously motivated
persecution, “provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion

94

Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).

95

8 U.S.C. § 1182(f ) (2012).

96

Id. Section 1.

97

Id. Section 5(a).
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in the individual’s country of nationality.”98 The January 27 EO also suspended
the admission of Syrian refugees indefinitely.99 Finally, the first EO reduced the
number of refugees accepted by the United States from President Obama’s target
of 100,000 down to 50,000.100
On February 3, 2017, in the case of Washington v. Trump, a federal district
court entered a nation-wide Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against
enforcement of the EO.101 In the TRO, federal district court judge James L.
Robart found that the EO adversely affected the states’ residents “in areas of
employment, education, business, family relations, and freedom to travel.”102 In
addition, the court found that the EO inflicted harm upon the states’ universities
and institutes of higher education.103
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the restraining order on
February 9, 2017.104 In its decision, the court found that “although courts owe
considerable deference to the President’s policy determinations with respect to
immigration and national security, it is beyond question that the federal judiciary
retains the authority to adjudicate constitutional challenges to executive action.”105
On this basis, the court concluded that the EO created several procedural due
process and religious discrimination problems that the government was unlikely
to win on the merits.106 On March 15, 2017, the Ninth Circuit voted against
en banc rehearing to consider vacatur of the panel opinion in Washington v.
Trump denying the stay of the district court’s injunction.107 Thus, at the time of
publication, the case has been remanded to the district court for further litigation.
On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued a new executive order aimed
at rectifying some of the deficiencies federal courts identified in the January 27
order.108 In the second EO, the administration stated that the policy and purpose

98

Id. Section 5(b).

99

See id. Section 5(c).

100

See id. Section 5(d).

See Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb.
3, 2017), appeal dismissed sub nom.
101

102

Id.

103

Id.

See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017) (order granting motion for
temporary restraining order), reconsideration en banc denied, No. 17-35105, 2017 WL 992527 (9th
Cir. Mar. 15, 2017).
104

105

Id. at 1164.

106

Id. at 1167.

See Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105, 2017 WL 992527, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 15,
2017) (order denying reconsideration of previous order en banc).
107

108

Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
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of the order was to “improve the screening and vetting protocols and procedures
associated with the visa-issuance process and the USRAP.”109 As evidence for the
necessity of the EO, the second order attributed threats to national security to the
admission of refugees.110 The second order again halted the Refugee Admission
Program for a 120 day period pending review of the program’s procedures and
protocols and reduced the number of refugee admissions for the fiscal year to
50,000.111 However, the order removed language related to “religious minorities”
and Syrian refugees.112 Notably, the second Executive Order makes a sweeping
statement in the refugee federalism context.113 As discussed in more detail below,
such a statement signals an intention on the part of federal policy makers to give
more power to the states in the refugee resettlement process.114 Yet, this EO was
also enjoined by the federal courts, which found that that the EO was potentially
a violation of the establishment clause and likely to result in harm to the plaintiffs
in the case.115 Ongoing litigation over the scope of executive authority and the
admission of refugees to the United States will be an important factor shaping the
refugee resettlement debate into the near future.

C. Sub-National Resettlement Implementation
The regulation of the admission and exclusion of non-citizens, including
asylees and refugees, is a matter of federal law.116 The U.S. Supreme Court
upheld this principal in Arizona v. United States, in which it reiterated that “the
Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject
of immigration and the status of aliens.”117 This authority rests, in part, on the
Federal Government’s constitutional power to “‘establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization,’ . . . and its inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct
relations with foreign nations.”118

109
Id. at Section 1(a) (Mar. 6, 2017) (establishing a renewal of USRAP restrictions outlined in
Exec. Order No. 13769).
110
Id. Section 1(h) (stating that “[s]ince 2001, hundreds of persons born abroad have been
convicted of terrorism-related crimes in the United States. They have included not just persons who
came here legally on visas but also individuals who first entered the country as refugees.”).
111

Id. Section 6(b).

112

Id.

113

Id. at Section 6(d).

114

See infra notes 238–288 and accompanying text.

Hawai’i v. Trump, No. 17-00050 DKW-KSC, 2017 WL 1011673, *at 16 –17 (D. Haw.
Mar. 15, 2017) (order granting motion for temporary restraining order).
115

Elias, supra note 14, at 402 (“Longstanding legal doctrines preclude the states form
taking actions that control immigrant admission and exclusion, committing that role to the
federal government.”).
116

117

Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012).

118

Id. at 421.
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Yet, in the operation of the resettlement of refugees from abroad to communities
inside the United States, sub-national state actors play an important role. Congress
envisioned that the process of resettling refugees into communities in the U.S.
would involve close cooperation between the federal immigration agencies, the
U.S. Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Service’s Office of Refugee Resettlement
(ORR), and state governments and non-governmental organizations, often
referred to as private nonprofit voluntary agencies (VOLAGs).119 Accordingly,
Congress and federal agencies have created an intricate regulatory scheme to carry
out the work of refugee resettlement.
First, the Immigration and Nationality Act creates a framework for state and
federal government consultation on the placement of refugees within the United
States.120 The Act requires that the ORR “shall consult regularly (not less often
than quarterly) with State and local governments and private nonprofit voluntary
agencies concerning the sponsorship process and the intended distribution of
refugees among the States and localities before their placement in those States
and localities.”121 The Act further requires that ORR “develop and implement,
in consultation with representatives of voluntary agencies and State and local
governments, policies and strategies for the placement and resettlement of
refugees within the United States.”122 Such consultation should take into account
areas already highly impacted by the presences of refugees.123
To determine where refugees are resettled in the United States, representatives
of local affiliates of voluntary agencies regularly meet with representatives of state
and local governments to plan and coordinate the appropriate placement of
refugees. These meetings are designed to consider existing refugee populations,
the availability of housing, employment opportunities, and other resources, and
the likelihood of a refugee becoming self-sufficient in that area.124 VOLAGs meet

See Voluntary Agencies, Office of Refugee Resettlement (Jul. 17, 2017), https://www.
acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/voluntary-agencies (listing the Department of State’s agreements with
nine official VOLAGs authorized to undertake refugee resettlement: Church World Service,
Ethiopian Community Development Council, Episcopal Migration Ministries, Hebrew Immigrant
Aid Society, International Rescue Committee, US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants,
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, and
World Relief Corporation.) U.S. Refugee Admissions Program FAQs, U.S. Dep’t of State (Jan. 20,
2017), https://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2017/266447. htm [hereinafter USRAP
Factsheet] (stating that VOLAGs must apply for grant funding annually in a competitive process in
which the organizations must demonstrate their capacity to resettle refugees).
119

120

8 U.S.C. § 1522 (2012).

121

Id. § 1522(a)(2)(A).

122

Id. § 1522(a)(2)(B).

123

Id. § 1522(a)(2)(C)(i).

124

Id. § 1522(a)(2)(C)(iii).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2017

17

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 17 [2017], No. 2, Art. 1

290

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 17

weekly with Department of State officials at the Refugee Processing Center in
order to determine which of the agencies will resettle individual refugees and
refugee families.125 The committee considers such factors as “family size,
nationality, ethnicity, religion, and medical conditions” to determine which
placement option is best for the approved refugees.126
Federal law and regulations provide different structures for state engagement
in the resettlement of refugees. The goal of refugee resettlement, no matter
which administrative form is chosen, is “to provide for the effective resettlement
of refugees and to assist them to achieve economic self-sufficiency as quickly
as possible.”127 The regulations stipulate that “[i]n order for a state to receive
refugee resettlement assistance from funds” under Immigration and National Act
§ 414, it must choose a program structure and submit a plan to the ORR.128
Currently, refugee resettlement at the sub-national level takes one of three
programmatic forms: (1) state administered plans; (2) public-private partnerships;
and (3) Wilson-Fish programs. The next section of this article will explore each
type of state-level refugee resettlement structure.

1. State Administered Resettlement
Under a “state administered” refugee resettlement plan, the state government
itself serves as the primary administrator of federal monies and coordinates all
aspects of refugee resettlement in the state.129 To initiate a state-administered
refugee resettlement program, a state government submits to the ORR a detailed
plan that outlines, among other criteria, how the state will coordinate cash and
medical assistance, language training, and employment services with local service
and voluntary agencies.130 In addition, either the governor or the state legislature
must appoint an employee to act as a state coordinator with responsibility for
coordinating refugee resettlement within the state.131 Finally, the state coordinator
commits to holding regular meetings with representatives of local resettlement
agencies, local community service agencies, and local government officials “to
plan and coordinate the appropriate placement of refugees in advance of the
refugees’ arrival.”132

125
Andorra Bruno, Cong. Research Serv., R41570, U.S. Refugee Resettlement
Assistance 7 (2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41570.pdf.
126

Id. at 8.

127

45 C.F.R. § 400.1(b) (2017).

128

Id. § 400.4(a).

129

Id.

130

8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(6) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 400.5(a)–(c) (2017).

131

45 C.F.R. § 400.5(d) (2017).

132

Id. § 400.5(h).
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After ORR approves a state administered plan, the state becomes eligible for
two types of federal grants: (1) Cash assistance, medical assistance, and related
administrative costs (CMA grants); and (2) Social services grants.133 The state
is reimbursed for 100% of the services provided to refugees under the Cash and
Medical Assistance program, the Refugee Medical Assistance program, and the
Unaccompanied Refugee Minor program, as well as the associated administrative
costs.134 Under a state plan, the state may not delegate “the responsibility for
administering or supervising the administration of the plan” and retains full
responsibility for the administration of federal dollars and the provision of services
to newly arrived refugees.135

2. Public-Private Partnerships
As an alternative to a state-administered resettlement program, a state
may instead elect to enter into a public/private partnership program (PPP).136
Under a PPP, a state chooses to establish a program between the state and a local
resettlement agency, or VOLAG, whereby the VOLAG local affiliate will provide
cash assistance and services to the resettled refugees directly.137 Many states elect
to operate a PPP because it enables more effective and better quality resettlement
led by VOLAGs. Because VOLAG affiliates are community-based organizations
with a substantial amount of exposure to refugee populations and the resources
they require, they are often considered to “have a greater understanding of the
cultural issues faced by refugees than state agencies and can serve them more
effectively.”138 Under the PPP, the VOLAG carries out the daily operations of
refugee resettlement while the state maintains responsibility for policy and
administrative oversight.139

133

Id. § 400.11.

Refugee Resettlement Program; Requirements for Refugee Cash Assistance; and Refugee
Medical Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. 65,15410 65,15411 (Mar. 22, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. Parts
400 and 401), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2000-03-22/pdf/00-6848.pdf.
134

135

45 C.F.R. § 400.22(a) (2017).

136

Id. § 400.57.

Bruno, supra note 126, at 12; Mary Farrel, Bret Barden & Mike Mueller, The
Evaluation of the Refugee Social Service (RSS) and Targeted Assistance Formula Grant
(TAG) Programs: Synthesis of Findings from Three Sites 16 (The Lewin Group, 2008), https://
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/orr/synthesisoffindingsfromthreesites.pdf.
137

138

Id.

See Annual ORR Report to Congress - 2005: Public/Private Partnerships, Office of Refugee
Resettlement (May 6, 2014), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/annual-orr-report-to-congress2005-public-private-partnerships.
139
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3. Wilson-Fish Models
The Wilson-Fish program is the third type of state-level refugee resettlement
structure. The Wilson-Fish administrative model emerged in 1985, in response to
Congress’ concern about the burden to states in the administration of the refugee
resettlement program.140 The Wilson-Fish Alternative Program was intended to be
an alternative to state-administered refugee assistance programs, and was created,
in part, to ensure that refugee assistance programs exist in every state where
refugees are resettled.141 Named after its sponsors, the “Wilson-Fish Alternative
Program,” establishes that:
[ORR] shall develop and implement alternative projects for
refugees who have been in the United States less than thirty-six
months, under which refugees are provided interim support,
medical services, support services, and case management, as
needed, in a manner that encourages self-sufficiency, reduces
welfare dependency, and fosters greater coordination among the
resettlement agencies and service providers.142
In practice, the Wilson-Fish program allows VOLAGs to administer federal
refugee resettlement cash and medical funds and provide social services, including
employment, case management, and English language instruction, largely
without the participation of the state government. As the Seventh Circuit recently
held, “in states that choose not to participate in the refugee assistance program
the federal government has been authorized to establish an alternative program,
called Wilson/Fish, that distributes federal aid to refugees in a state without
the involvement of the state government.”143 While the Wilson-Fish program
has been criticized for circumventing states’ rights in determining voluntary
participation in the refugee resettlement program,144 no court has found the
legislation unconstitutional. Currently, twelve states conduct refugee resettlement
through the Wilson-Fish program.145

140

H.R.J. Res. 648, 98th Congress (1984) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1522(e)(7) (2012)).

141

93 Interpreter Releases, Art. 16 (Sept. 5, 2016).

8 U.S.C. § 1522(c)(7)(A) (2012); see also 45 C.F.R. § 400.69 (2017) (“A State that
determines that a public/private RCA program or a publicly-administered program modeled after its
TANF program is not the best approach for the State may choose instead to establish an alternative
approach under the Wilson/Fish program, authorized by section 412(e)(7) of the INA.”).
142

143

Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence, 838 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 2016).

See, e.g., Michael Patrick Leahy, Why 12 States Hold the Key to a Constitutional Challenge
to the increasingly controversial U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program, Breitbart (Dec. 8, 2015), http://
www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/12/08/12-states-hold-key-constitutional-challengerefugee-resettlement-program/.
144

145

Fisk, supra note 8.
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In conclusion, the Refugee Convention and its Optional Protocol provide
the backbone for international cooperation and obligation with respect to the
treatment of refugees around the globe. Domestically, Congress has operationalized
U.S. international obligations through legislation that incorporates the treaty
definition of a refugee and provides a process for those who are physically within
its borders to apply for asylum and for those who have been identified as refugees
outside of its border to be resettled in the United States. At the state level, the
regulations define three levels of state engagement with the federal government
to relocate refugees in communities across the country. The next section of this
article will explore, in practice, the journey a refugee makes from third country
displacement to the chance to begin life again in the United States.

III. The Process of Refugee Resettlement:
From Displacement to Citizens in Waiting
As previously described, the refugee resettlement process begins when
the UNHCR or associated governmental officials conduct a refugee status
determination (RSD).146 The RSD is a legal process by which the UNHCR
and its partners determine whether a displaced individual is a refugee under
the definition provided by the Refugee Convention.147 Once the UNHCR has
determined that an individual meets the definition of a refugee, it then engages
in a process of determining which durable solution: voluntary repatriation,
integration, or resettlement, is appropriate for the refugee.148 The Inter-Agency
Standing Committee on Durable Solutions has established that “a durable
solution is achieved when [internally displaced persons] no longer have any
specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and
such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from
their displacement.”149 As such, durable solutions are permanent resolutions to a
refugee’s internal or external displacement.
In a small number of cases, the UNHCR determines that resettlement to a
third country is the most appropriate durable solution for a refugee or a refugee
family.150 In those instances, the UNHCR refers the refugee to a participating

See Refugee Status Determination, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/refugee-statusdetermination.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2017); see also supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
146

147

Id.; see Refugee Convention, supra note 18, art. 1(A)(2).

Finding Durable Solutions, UNHCR, 34– 36 (2009), http://www.unhcr.org/publ/
PUBL/4922d43b0.pdf.
148

Brookings Institution – University of Bern Project of Internal Displacement, IASC
Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons 5 (2010), http://www.
unhcr.org/50f94cd49.pdf.
149

Resettlement, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/resettlement.html (last visited Apr.
14, 2017) (only 1% of displaced persons are actually resettled in third countries).
150
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resettlement country’s national representatives.151 When the United States is
the recipient of the UNHCR’s referral, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of
Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) begins its review process.152 PRM
officials begin this process by working through an administrative office, known
as a Resettlement Support Center (RSC), to capture the refugee’s biometric data
(fingerprints, photograph).153 Multiple U.S. agencies, including the Department
of Homeland Security, use this biometric data to conduct security screening
and background checks.154 In addition to a security screening, a representative
of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) conducts an
additional interview to ensure that the individual meets the definition of a refugee
under U.S. law and does not pose a safety or security threat to the United States.155
Once a refugee applicant has passed the USCIS interview process, she next
undergoes a health screening to ensure that she does not carry communicable
diseases that will pose a health risk to individuals living in the United States.156
Prior to departure for the United States, the RSC obtains “sponsorship assurance”
from a voluntary agency that assists with refugee resettlement upon arrival in
the U.S.157 Organizations such as the International Organization For Migration
(IOM) often conduct “cultural orientation” programs for departing refugees
to acquaint refugees with unfamiliar cultural norms in the United States and
“[reduce] anxiety on the part of refugees and migrants by painting a more realistic
picture of what awaits them.”158 The entire process from referral by the UNHCR
to departure to the United States can take eighteen months to two years.159
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program: Application and Case Processing, U.S. Dep’t of State,
https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/index.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2017). [hereinafter
USRAP Processing] (Occasionally, a U.S. Embassy or a specially trained nongovernmental
organization will refer a refugee to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program.)
151

152
Id. (“Some refugees can start the application process with the RSC without a referral from
UNHCR or other entity. This includes close relatives of asylees and refugees already in the United
States and refugees who belong to specific groups set forth in statute or identified by the Department
of State as being eligible for direct access to the program.”).
153

Id.

Id.; see also The Refugee Processing and Screening System, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/266671.pdf (“U.S. national security agencies, including
the National Counterterrorism Center, FBI, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the
Department of Defense, and the Department of State, as well as the intelligence community, begin
screening the applicant using the data transmitted from the RSCs. The screening checks for security
threats, including connections to known bad actors, and past immigration or criminal violations.
For Syrian applicants, DHS conducts an additional enhanced review. Refugees are screened more
carefully than any other type of traveler to the U.S.”).
154

155

USRAP Processing, supra note 152.

156

Id.

157

Id.

International Organization for Migration, Pre-Departure Orientation / Cultural
Orientation 1 (2004), http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/pre-departure_orientation.pdf.
158

159

USRAP Processing, supra note 152.
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Weekly, the nine authorized VOLAGs meet at ORR offices in Virginia to
determine which VOLAG will assume leadership for the resettlement of the
refugee and which communities in the United States are most appropriate for
the refugee’s resettlement.160 In determining placement, VOLAG representatives
consider the particular needs of a refugee, the resources available in particular
resettlement communities, and whether a refugee has family or relatives in the
United States.161 If a refugee has family ties in the United States, he or she is likely
to be resettled near family members.162 Once a relocation community has been
determined, refugees travel to the United States on a plane ticket that is paid for
by a loan from the U.S. government, which must be repaid.163
Upon arrival in the country, refugees are again screened for security purposes
by Customs and Border Protection Officers.164 Representatives of VOLAGs then
meet arriving refugees at the airport, and the local resettlement process begins
when representatives take refugees to their new homes.165 At the outset, PRM
provides VOLAGs with a one-time monetary grant per refugee to cover the early
costs of helping a refugee become established in her new home and community.166
These costs include rent, furnishings, food, and clothing.167 Following initial
resettlement, refugees are eligible to receive various forms of federal financial and
medical assistance for up to thirteen months from the date of admission.168
As lawful immigrants, refugees are eligible for employment authorization
immediately upon their arrival.169 In addition, one year after arrival, refugees
must apply to adjust their status to that of a lawful permanent resident (LPR).170
After five years of holding LPR status, a former refugee becomes eligible for

160
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program: The Reception and Placement Program: Planning for
Refugees’ Arrival in the United States, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/
receptionplacement/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [hereinafter USRAP Arrival Plan].
161

Id.

162

Id.

163

Id.

164

USRAP Processing, supra note 152.

165

Id.

166

USRAP Arrival Plan, supra note 161.

167

Id.

45 C.F.R. § 400.203 (2017); U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., Administration
Children and Families, Summary of ORR Benefits and Services to Eligible Populations,
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/orr/orr_fact_sheet_benefits_at_a_glance.pdf (last visited
Apr. 14, 2017).
168

for

169

8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a) (2017).

8 C.F.R. § 209.1(a)(1) (2017) (“Every alien in the United States who is classified as a
refugee under 8 CFR part 207, whose status has not been terminated, is required to apply to USCIS
one year after entry in order for USCIS to determine his or her admissibility under section 212 of
the Act, without regard to paragraphs (4), (5), and (7)(A) of section 212(a) of the Act.”).
170
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naturalization.171 Reports regularly find that refugees quickly find their way to
economic self-sufficiency in the United States, with “income levels and rates of
public benefits usage” approximating those of United States-born citizens.172 In
fact, as previously noted, refugees can aid economic growth in communities of
resettlement, improving the overall picture for both United States citizens and
non-citizens alike.173 Essentially, refugees, once admitted, are citizens in waiting.

IV. One in Fifty: The Refugee Resettlement Debate in Wyoming
The refugee resettlement story in Wyoming begins in the Democratic Congo
with one man: Bertine Bahige.174 In the late 1990s, rebel soldiers fighting in the
eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) ripped thirteen-yearold Bertine away from his family at gunpoint.175 The rebels were forcibly recruiting
young boys to join their ranks and assist them in their struggle to gain power and
access to natural resources following the 1994 Rwandan genocide.176 For the next
two years of his life, rebels forced Bertine to serve as a child soldier.177 Back in
the DRC, fighting and civil conflict displaced his remaining family members,
including nine siblings.178 Luckily, Bertine was able to escape rebel forces and find
his way to a refugee camp in Mozambique, where the UNHCR identified him as a
Convention refugee.179 UNHCR then determined that because Bertine could no
longer locate his displaced family, he was a candidate for the durable solution of
resettlement.180 The U.S. State Department subsequently resettled Bertine in the

171

8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2012).

See, e.g., The Integration Outcomes of U.S. Refugees, Migration Policy Institute, http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/research/integration-outcomes-us-refugees-successes-and-challenges (last
visited Apr. 14, 2017).
172

173

Legrain, supra note 93; see also supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.

The author has been involved with discussions on refugee resettlement in Wyoming since
the fall of 2013. Prior to this time, discussions surrounding refugee resettlement in Wyoming might
have taken place, but the author has been unable to find a legislative or policy history to show that
refugee resettlement had received extensive state-level consideration before 2013.)
174

175
Kyle Roerink, Former Child Soldier Wants Refugee Office in Wyoming, Casper Star
Tribune, Feb. 22, 2014, http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/former-childsoldier-wants-refugee-office-in-wyoming/article_13c8457f-683b-51a9-b037-b9119eceb426.html;
see also Wyoming PBS, Wyoming Chronicle: Thanksgiving, YouTube (Nov. 16, 2012), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=cfL0IIH920w&t=920s [hereinafter Wyoming Chronicle] (tracing
Bertine Bahige’s path to Wyoming through the refugee resettlement program to the University of
Wyoming); Caroline Ballard, From The Congo To Coal Country: One Man’s Journey From Refugee
To Wyomingite, Wyoming Public Media (Aug. 21, 2015), http://wyomingpublicmedia.org/post/
congo-coal-country-one-mans-journey-refugee-wyomingite.
176

Roerink, supra note 176.

177

Wyoming Chronicle, supra note 176.
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Roerink, supra note 176.
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Id.
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See Solutions for Refugees, supra note 77.
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United States and placed him in a community near Baltimore, Maryland.181 He
excelled in his new environment, working several jobs to save money for college
and becoming accustomed to his new home.182 At the same time, he missed his
family.183 Since rebels had taken him from the DRC, he had not heard from his
mother or siblings, and he feared for their safety and well-being.184
In 2006, the University of Wyoming awarded Bertine a scholarship to play
soccer.185 He seized the opportunity to move West, and once again, made the
most of the opportunity to start his life anew: this time, as a college student.
Bertine was actively involved on campus and met his future wife, Amanda, at
the University.186 Upon graduation, the couple married and moved to Gillette,
Wyoming, where they started a family.187 Bertine has since obtained a Masters
degree, naturalized, and is now the principal of a public school in Gillette.188
He is, by all accounts, a successful, productive and important member of his
Wyoming community.
In 2010, Bertine began thinking about Wyoming as a home for refugees.189 He
looked at a map of states that participate in refugee resettlement and noticed that
Wyoming was strangely a different color than every other state in the country.190
This was, of course, because Wyoming is the only state in the country that does
not participate in the affirmative resettlement of refugees.191 Wyoming has no
VOLAGs currently operating in the State, and the State of Wyoming has neither
a state administered, public-private partnership, or Wilson-Fish agreement in
place with the federal government or voluntary agencies. As such, Wyoming is
one in fifty.

181

Roerink, supra note 176.

182

Id.

183

Wyoming Chronicle, supra note 176.

184

Id.

185

Roerink, supra note 176.

Caroline Ballard, Wyoming Debates Refugee Resettlement Program, Wyoming Public
M edia , Sept. 25, 2015, http://wyomingpublicmedia.org/post/wyoming-debates-refugeeresettlement-program.
186

187

See Roerink, supra note 176.

Wyoming: Bertine Bahige, Refugee Congress, http://refugeecongress.org/bertine-bahige/
(last accessed May 4, 2017).
188

189

Roerink, supra note 176.

See, e.g., Find Resources and Contacts in Your State, Office of Refugee Resettlement,
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/state-programs-annual-overview (last visited Apr. 14, 2017).
190

Emma Breysse, Lack of programs makes refugee replacement unlikely, Jackson Hole News
& Guide, Dec. 2, 2015, http://www.jhnewsandguide.com/news/features/lack-of-programs-makesrefugee-replacement-unlikely/article_97b81c10-6b31-5647-a3d1-ab6e86f96e46.html.
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In thinking about his life in Wyoming, Bertine reflected on his love and
appreciate for the State.192 He thought about the excellent education he received
at the University of Wyoming.193 He thought about the wonderful family he had
found through his wife, a Gillette native.194 He thought about the students he
taught in Campbell County Schools, and how their curiosity about his life and
his story reflected an appreciation for diversity and a kindness of spirit.195 Bertine’s
reflections on his life in Wyoming and his appreciation for his community caused
him to begin asking: “Why not Wyoming?”196 In an interview with a state
newspaper, Bertine noted “When you come from nothing, it’s not easy to find
your way in a big community . . . . That’s the beauty of Wyoming: small and
family oriented communities. If you fall, people will pick you up.”197
Thus began an ongoing discussion about the future of refugee resettlement
in Wyoming. In 2013, Bertine contacted the University of Wyoming College of
Law’s International Human Rights Clinic.198 Along with clinical law students,
Bertine began researching the requirements for a refugee resettlement program
and brought together stakeholders to engage in discussions with members of
Governor Matt Mead’s policy teams. Bertine and students attended multiple
meetings with state government officials and provided information about refugee
resettlement, describing the different structures a refugee resettlement program
might take in the State. VOLAGs participated in these discussions and indicated
an interest in participating in a refugee resettlement program in Wyoming.199
These efforts culminated in a September 2013 letter from Matt Mead, the
Governor of Wyoming, to the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement, stating:
The State of Wyoming has elected to pursue a Public-Private
Partnership model of a refugee Resettlement program
and to participate in that program through the Office of
Refugee Resettlement. This formalizes the work of many
interested persons and organizations across many years.

192
Video Recording of the Panel Discussion, Wyoming’s Immigration Policy, Wyo. News and
Pub. Aff., Mar. 23, 2016, http://video.wyomingpbs.org/video/2365702898/.
193

Id.

194

Id.

195

Wyoming Chronicle, supra note 176, 4:30– 4:55.

196

Wyoming’s Immigration Policy, supra note 193.

197

Roerink, supra note 176.

The author serves as the faculty Director of the International Human Rights Clinic and
supervised University of Wyoming College of Law students in their research on refugee resettlement
in Wyoming. She was also present at meetings with law students, Mr. Bahige, Lutheran Family
Services, and Governor Matt Mead’s policy teams.
198
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See supra note 199.
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Wyoming will designate a Refugee Resettlement Coordinator
in the near future.200
However, after Governor Mead submitted the letter, the process stalled.
Shortly thereafter, in 2014, a gubernatorial election year in Wyoming, Governor
Mead’s stance on refugee resettlement shifted. His policy position migrated from
electing to pursue refugee resettlement in the State through a public/private
partnership,201 to “learn[ing] more about what is done in Wyoming.”202 In a
March 2014 editorial, he stated:
There have been recent discussions about refugees coming to
Wyoming. It is an important issue as refugees are coming now
and have been coming to Wyoming with our state having no
plan or say on the matter. Questions of what, if any, resources are
being used and how they are used remain unanswered. We are
the only state in the country without a plan or process.203
In response to his requests for further discussions about refugee resettlement,
Governor Mead faced a backlash. Refugee resettlement restrictionists, such as Ann
Corcoran of the Refugee Resettlement Watch blog, began highlighting stories
from Wyoming.204 A citizens group called Citizens Protecting Wyoming organized
anti-refugee resettlement protests and stated that “[t]he people of Wyoming are
caring and generous . . . .Yet that does not mean we are OK with being forced
to increase the burden to our health, safety, welfare, medical, community and
educational programs via our tax dollars.”205
Because 2014 was an election year, Governor Mead also faced criticism from
political opponent Taylor Haynes. Gubernatorial candidate Haynes expressed
concern about the introduction of communicable diseases such as HIV, Ebola or
drug-resistant tuberculosis through refugee communities in addition to concerns

200
Letter from Matthew H. Mead, Governor of Wyo., to Mr. Eskinder Negash, Dir., Office
of Refugee Resettlement (September 5, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Governor Mead
2013 Letter].
201

Id.

Governor Matt Mead, Editorial, It’s Important to Have a Wyoming Plan for Refugees, Casper
Star Tribune, Mar. 16, 2014, http://trib.com/opinion/columns/mead-it-s-important-to-have-awyoming-plan-for/article_76d7f22a-197f-522a-b2bd-9802a3dfaaec.html.
202

203

Id.

Ann Corcoran, Wyoming Public Radio pushing refugee resettlement for Wyoming, Refugee
Resettlement Watch, Mar. 14, 2016, https://refugeeresettlementwatch.wordpress.com/tag/wyoming/.
204

Trevor Brown, Refugee Program Worries Locals, Wyo. Tribune Eagle, Nov. 1, 2014, http://
www.wyomingnews.com/news/refugee-program-worries-locals/article_74911f86-ec6e-5ca1-821aad9c0511aca6.html#.VFw4N5UtBwG.
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about terrorism.206 “I think they’re groups of people brought in to kill our labor
and undermine our culture,” Haynes said.207 Mead responded by denying that the
State was engaged in refugee resettlement or “importing refugees.”208 Rather, Mead
described that Wyoming was “exploring the idea of having a refugee resettlement
program. Count the number of refugees we’ve brought under my administration,”
Mead said. “Zero.”209 In a follow up interview, a spokesperson for Governor Mead
said that community interest must pave the way for the establishment of a refugee
resettlement program in Wyoming.210 However, Mead’s spokesperson stated, “no
interested group has offered a recommendation to establish a program to date,”211
a statement that failed to consider the tireless advocacy of Bertine Bahige and
other citizens within the State.
Governor Mead was reelected in November 2014.212 Following the 2014
election, Mead appeared dismayed by the tone taken by certain opponents of
refugee resettlement. “What we saw in that debate in my mind was nonfactual
and, in fact, hurtful. . . . When we heard during the political season various
descriptions of refugees, you know, it felt like to me we were going backwards.”213
Recognizing that the level of discourse had been reduced to “terms none of us
would be proud of,”214 Mead asked the Wyoming Humanities Council to lead
civic dialogue around the State regarding refugee resettlement.215 The Humanities
Council subsequently hosted several events around the State that gave citizens of

Laura Hancock, Mead, Haynes Differ on Refugees, Federal Intrusion at Casper debate,
Casper Star Tribune, Jul. 15, 2014, http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/
mead-haynes-differ-on-refugees-federal-intrusion-at-casper-debate/article_5a36487f-d556-54f9902e-bbc16b12b97f.html.
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Id.
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Id.
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Brown, supra note 206.
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Id.

Trevor Brown, Mead Wins 2nd Term as Governor, Wyoming Tribune Eagle, Nov. 4, 2014,
http://www.wyomingnews.com/news/mead-wins-nd-term-as-governor/article_466828a3-d5bf5460-a7d0-0da2539dab90.html.
212

213
Laura Hancock, Mead Asks for Factual Nonracist Discussion on Refugees (w/audio),
Casper Star Tribune, Jul. 1, 2015, http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/
mead-asks-for-factual-nonracist-discussion-on-refugees-w-audio/article_7d65b708-e4a0-5bcbb3e8-2cc1a12764fc.html.

Opinion: Refugee Plan Would Give State Control, Wyoming Tribune Eagle, Apr. 27, 2014,
http://www.wyomingnews.com/opinion/refugee-plan-would-give-state-control/article_219457da98a3-5e1a-b745-71599412e778.html.
214

Caroline Ballard, Governor Mead Says With No Refugee Resettlement Program, Wyoming
At A Disadvantage, Wyo. Public Media (Dec. 7, 2015), http://wyomingpublicmedia.org/post/
governor-mead-says-no-refugee-resettlement-program-wyoming-disadvantage.
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Wyoming an opportunity to ask questions about refugee resettlement and become
informed about the process.216
At the end of 2015, terrorist attacks struck Paris, killing 130 and wounding
hundreds.217 President Francois Hollande described the attacks as an act of war
organized by Islamic militant groups.218 While directly following the attacks the
press reported that the terrorists were carrying Syrian passports, it was later revealed
that the attackers were only posing as Syrian refugees.219 Nonetheless, following
the attacks, over thirty state governors called for a halt on the resettlement of
Syrian refugees to the United States, including Governor Mead.220 On November
17, 2015, Mead’s press release stated:
The President needs to make certain an absolutely thorough
vetting system is in place that will not allow terrorists from
Syria or any other part of the world into our country. In light of
the horrific terrorist attacks in Paris, I have joined other
governors in demanding the refugee process be halted until it is
guaranteed to provide the security demanded by Wyoming and
United States citizens.221
Governor Mead’s public statement was peculiar in light of the fact that
Wyoming has never formally participated in the federal refugee resettlement
program.222 To date, the Governor has made no further efforts to create a state
administered or public-private partnership refugee resettlement program.
The final chapter of Wyoming’s refugee resettlement debate ends in the halls
of the State’s capital. During the 2016 legislative session, Representative Tom

216
Michael Rotellini, Wyoming Humanities Council to Discuss Refugee Situation, T he
B randing I ron , Dec. 4, 2015, http://www.uwbrandingiron.com/2015/12/04/wyominghumanities-council-to-discuss-refugee-situation/.
217
Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night, BBC (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-34818994.
218

Id.

James Rothwell, Majority of Paris Attackers Used Migration Routes to Enter Europe, Reveals
Hungarian Counter-Terror Chief, The Telegraph (Oct. 2, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2016/10/02/majority-of-paris-attackers-used-migration-routes-to-enter-europ/.
219

Arnie Seipel, 30 Governors Call for Halt to U.S. Resettlement of Syrian Refugees,
NPR (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/17/456336432/more-governors-oppose-u-sresettlement-of-syrian-refugees.
220

Press Release, Office of Governor Matt Mead, Governor Mead Says No Refugees Under
Flawed System (Nov. 17, 2015), https://sites.google.com/a/wyo.gov/governor/media/news-releases/
2015-news-releases/governormeadsaysnorefugeesunderflawedsystem.
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Suzan M. Pritchett, Note to Mead: Wyoming Never Has Taken Refugees, WyoFile, Nov. 20,
2015, http://www.wyofile.com/note-mead-wyoming-never-taken-refugees/.
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Reeder of Casper, Wyoming introduced House Bill 47.223 The bill attempted to
make the Wyoming legislature, rather than the Governor’s office, the only statelevel authority with the ability to enact or administer a “refugee or asylum seeking
resettlement program.”224 In addition, the bill would have required the Governor
to rescind “all refugee resettlement plans or agreements submitted to the office of
refugee resettlement within the department of health and human services.”225
Moreover, the bill required that any future Wyoming refugee resettlement
plan should include, among other criteria, a plan for how the State intends to
achieve refugee self-sufficiency as quickly as possible, a description of all funds
available to administer the plan, and a projection of any state funds necessary to
administer the resettlement program.226 Finally, the proposed bill required that
prior to approval, a joint committee would hold hearings to receive comments
from Wyoming citizens, local government representatives, volunteer agencies and
other interested parties on the plan prior to authorizing any refugee resettlement
program.227 House Bill 47 passed out of the house by a vote of fifty-one to nine
and was advanced to the Senate, but failed introduction.228
Generally, the identification of refugees, the selection of refugees for
resettlement, and the admission of refugees into the United States are largely
the work of the federal government and international agencies.229 However, the
ongoing debate around refugee resettlement in the State of Wyoming within both
the State’s executive and legislative branches is indicative of the growing interest
of states in trying to control the arrival of and movement of refugees within their
borders. Immigration scholar Stella Elias has described the phenomenon of refugee
federalism,230 in which some states struggle to assert their Tenth Amendment rights
to control the perceived threats of refugees against the exclusive federal power to
regulate immigration.231 What does refugee federalism mean for Wyoming in its
one in fifty exceptionalism? The next section of this article will explore through
the refugee federalism framework Wyoming’s exclusionary position in light of an
ongoing national backlash against refugee resettlement.
H.B. 47, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2016), http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2016/bills/
HB0047.pdf.
223

Id. § 9-21-101(a). (Under the terms of the proposed bill, it is not clear what an “asylum
seeking program” involves, as asylum is an application process that is pursued solely with the federal
immigration agency); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2012).
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HB47, § 9-21-101(b) (2016).
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Id. § 9-21-101(c)(i).
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Id. § 9-21-101(d).

See HB 47, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2016), http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2016/Digest/
HB0047.pdf.
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V. Refugee Federalism and Wyoming
As one commentator has noted, “[the law is both well settled and well
conceived on the relative roles of the state and federal government when it
comes to refugee crisis”.232 The power to resettle refugees necessarily lies with the
federal government with a limited role of consultation with the states because of
federal exclusivity over the regulation of immigration.233 As the Supreme Court
has reaffirmed time and time again, immigration law is a matter of federal law
incident to national sovereignty.234 Within this authority, the federal government
has consistently elected to resettle refugees within our borders as a matter of
policy and because of our commitment to providing safe-haven for individuals
who have faced persecution. This commitment is demonstrated by the United
States’ accession to the Refugee Convention, our robust asylum system, and our
tradition of being a global leader in welcoming refugees to our country.235
However, since 2013, there have been multiple efforts to increase the role
of states in responding to the refugee crisis through state-level regulation and
executive action. As immigration scholars Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan have
noted, “immigration federalism is variegated landscape with room for states
to maneuver on both restrictionist and integrationist policies.”236 As Elias has
described in her article The Perils and Possibilities of Refugee Federalism, some
of these efforts have reflected states’ desire to support refugees as they resettle
in new communities and begin their lives again.237 Others have involved both
Congress and state governments pushing back against the federal immigration
authority and attempting to assert states’ rights in determining who, what, and
how many refugees a state must resettle.238
So where does Wyoming fit into this landscape? To date, Wyoming’s brand
of refugee rulemaking has focused on whether and how Wyoming should join
the refugee resettlement program, or whether it should continue to assert itself
as the one in fifty states that does not affirmatively resettle refugees. Interestingly,
perhaps the decision is not Wyoming’s to make. Through exploring the refugee
federalism discussion playing out across the United States, this section of the
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Vladeck, supra note 15.

233

Id.

234

Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 393 (2012).
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See Meissner, supra note 43.
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Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 15, at 201.

See Elias, supra note 14, at 391–398 (describing efforts by state governors to issue executive
orders and decrees in support of refugees in addition to state legislative efforts to increase funding
for refugee resettlement and programs).
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Id., at 395, 403 (describing “Exclusionary lawmaking” in the area of refugee resettlement
as laws reflecting an anti-refugee or anti-asylee purpose).
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article contextualizes the refugee resettlement discussion in Wyoming in a larger
national conversation. It then analyses the possibility of refugee resettlement
without affirmative consent and weighs the benefits of cooperative refugee
resettlement in Wyoming.

A. Preserving Exceptionalism: Lessons Learned from the
Restrictionist Movement
Imagine a hypothetical. It is 2017 and Wyoming has failed to move forward
with a plan to establish an affirmative refugee resettlement program in the State.
However, there is interest from the citizens of Wyoming in bringing refugees to
the State and there are refugees and asylees interested in or suited to resettlement
in Wyoming. These interested non-citizens include both those to whom USCIS
has granted asylum status and those refugees coming from abroad who are looking
to reunite with family or find safety from persecution in a new community in
the United States. A voluntary agency steps forward and approaches the federal
government with a plan to resettle refugees in Wyoming under the Wilson-Fish
program without approval from the State government. Would there be a legal
basis for refugee resettlement in the State without the State government’s consent?
If the governor issued an executive order calling for a halt of the resettlement of
refugees in the State or the legislature passed a bill banning the federal government’s
resettlement of refugees, would such action withstand constitutional scrutiny?
This is an interesting refugee federalism question, and one that has been playing
out in the halls of Congress and in state governments since 2013.239 As discussed
further below, the answer is that the federal government could resettle refugees
in Wyoming without the State’s consent—even in the face of gubernatorial or
legislative resistance.240 Supreme Court precedent, recent legislative action at both
the federal and state levels, and state litigation challenging federal immigration
action establish that states play a limited and inconsequential role in the refugee
resettlement process.241 Instances of the application of the federal preemption
doctrine in the area refugee resettlement will be discussed, in turn.
In the late 1800s, the Supreme Court had multiple occasions to consider
what role, if any, the states should play in the regulation of non-citizens within the
United States. Cases from this time period firmly established federal supremacy

239

See infra notes 243–250 and accompanying text.

Id. See generally Elias, supra note 14, at 391– 401 (describing the failure of state executive
orders, gubernatorial decrees, legislation, and litigation to half refugee resettlement at the subnational level).
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over immigration control.242 In 2012, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle
of exclusive federal authority over immigration in the case of Arizona v. United
States.243 In that case, the legislature of Arizona had enacted several state laws in
an attempt to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and
economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.”244 These
laws included two state-level misdemeanors for failing to register and attempting
to engage in unauthorized work within the State.245 Two other provisions bestowed
immigration enforcement authority on state and local law enforcement officers.246
In considering the validity of state legislation in the area of immigration, the
Court noted that “[t]he Government of the United States has broad, undoubted
power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.”247 This power
flows in part from the Constitution’s delegation of authority to Congress to
“establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” and is an incident of the United
States’ sovereignty as a nation.248 The Court held that because “federal governance
of immigration and alien status is extensive and complex” and forms a unitary
scheme for the regulation of non-citizens, Arizona’s attempt to regulate in the area
of immigration law was preempted.249
Arizona v. United States provides an important foundation for the refugee
resettlement discussion in Wyoming. While Wyoming has not attempted to pass
legislation that would bar the resettlement of refugees in the State, it also has
not acted to affirmatively join the refugee resettlement program. In addition,
recent legislative efforts indicate both and ideological and practical resistance to
joining in federal efforts.250 At the same time, refugees are coming to the State

242
See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876) (striking down California law requiring
bond for arriving immigrants as immigration law is matter of federal law); Henderson v. Mayor
of the City of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875) (striking down New York law requiring bond for
immigrants as immigration law is a matter of federal law); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581 (1889) (upholding the Federal Chinese Exclusion Act as immigration law is a matter of
federal law that is incident to sovereignty); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)
(holding that the right to exclude or to expel aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain
conditions, in war or in peace, is an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign nation.).
243

Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 393 (2012).

244
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Id. at 393 –394 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–1509, § 13–2928(C) (2012)).
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Id. (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–3883(A)(5), § 11–1051(B) (2012)).
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Id. at 394.
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Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012); see note 243.
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Id. at 395 (2012).

H.B. 47, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2016), http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2016/bills/HB0047.
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as secondary migrants,251 as asylees, and, potentially in the future, through
the Wilson-Fish Program, which does not consider a role for the state. Should
Wyoming attempt to limit the flow of refugees to the State through state-level
legislation, such actions would not prevail. As Stella Elias notes, “[t]o the extent
that state laws designed to control the inflow of refugees to their jurisdictions
serve as tools of immigrant exclusion, they are therefore clearly preempted under
the Court’s Arizona doctrine.”252
Under the existing regulatory scheme, the federal statutory resettlement
framework envisions only a limited role for states in refugee resettlement. As
noted, above,253 8 U.S.C. § 1552 provides a process for the federal government
to consult with states and localities regarding the distribution of refugees among
jurisdictions.254 In addition, the federal government shall “to the maximum extent
possible, take into account” the preferences of states and localities with respect to
the placement of refugees within a state.255 However, there is no statutory provision
that gives state governors or legislatures the ability to deny the admission of refugees
to their states. As one commentator noted, “There’s no veto; there’s no remedy
if the federal government doesn’t actually ‘consult’; and there’s no requirement
that the federal government actually implement whatever recommendations the
state may make.”256 Decisions regarding how many refugees are resettled in the
United States, which countries they come from, and where those refugees live lie
primarily with the federal executive branch.257
Recent Congressional legislative proposals support this conclusion. At
the time of writing, Congress is considering multiple bills that aim to address

Lucas High, Somalis Find New Home in Cheyenne, Wyo. Trib. Eagle, May 5, 2014, https://
www.wyomingnews.com/users/signup/?referer_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.wyomingnews.
com%2Fnews%2Fsomalis-find-new-home-in-cheyenne%2Farticle_239137ea-d0dc-5499-83a5365f1dc6aacd.html.
251

252

Elias, supra note 14, at 404.

See supra notes 18–94 and accompanying text (outlining the refugee resettlement statutory
and regulatory framework).
253

254

8 U.S.C. § 1522 (2012).

255

Id.

256

Vladeck, supra note 15.

Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Law is Clear: States Cannot Reject
Syrian Refugees, Wash. Post, Nov. 19, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/
wp/2015/11/19/the-law-is-clear-states-cannot-reject-syrian-refugees/?utm_term=.14d69339b4d3
(“Federal law emphatically does not provide authority for states to nullify the president’s decision
to increase the number or type of refugees or where those refugees will eventually live, though.
Congress, in the Refugee Act, lodged sole power over those decisions with the president and the
State Department, an important recognition of the connection between our country’s refugee policy
and foreign policy.”).
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the refugee federalism issue.258 For example, H.R. 546, the “No Resettlement
Without Consent Act” would create a process by which state or local legislatures
or state governors could have veto power over the placement of refugees within
state borders.259 Members of Congress have attempted to create similar veto
legislative efforts in previous legislative sessions without success.260 Accordingly,
the inclination of Congress to propose such legislation speaks to the underlying
power of the federal government to place refugees in states without the consent of
state governors or legislatures.
The recent executive orders also shed light on the power of state government
relative to the federal government in refugee resettlement. In his revised March
6, 2017 Executive Order, President Trump clearly indicated concern over the de
minimus role of states in refugee resettlement.261 Specifically, the EO seeks to give
states a greater voice in refugee resettlement, providing that:
It is the policy of the executive branch that, to the extent
permitted by law and as practicable, State and local jurisdictions
be granted a role in the process of determining the placement or
settlement in their jurisdictions of aliens eligible to be admitted
to the United States as refugees. To that end, the Secretary of
State shall examine existing law to determine the extent to which,
consistent with applicable law, State and local jurisdictions may
have greater involvement in the process of determining the
placement or resettlement of refugees in their jurisdictions, and
shall devise a proposal to lawfully promote such involvement.262
Finally, with respect to the question of whether the federal government
could resettle refugees in Wyoming without affirmative consent of the State
government, recent litigation proves illuminating. In 2015, following the terrorist
attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, a number of state governors indicated their
intent to withdraw from the refugee resettlement program, and particularly cease

258
See H.R. 546, 115th Cong. (2017) (assigned to committee on January 13, 2017); see also
H.R. 604, 115th Cong. (2017) (to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to permit the
governor of a state to reject the resettlement of a refugee in that state unless there is adequate
assurance that the alien “does not present a security risk”, and for other purposes); S. 211, 115th
Cong. (2017) (a bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to permit the Governor of a
State to reject the resettlement of a refugee in that State unless there is adequate assurance that the
alien “does not present a security risk,” and for other purposes).
259

See H.R. 546, 115th Cong. (2017).

260

See, e.g., Elias, supra note 14, at 388.
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Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).

262

Id. at Section 6(d).
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the resettlement of Syrian refugees within their states.263 Legislators in twelve
states attempted to pass legislation that would block the resettlement of Syrian
refugees.264 Yet, as of the end of 2016, none of these state efforts at “exclusionary
lawmaking”265 had succeeded, and the federal government continued to resettle
refugees, including Syrian refugees, in over thirty-one states whose governors had
promised the halt of resettlement.266 Again, the inability of state governments to
stop refugee resettlement within their borders speaks to the federal government’s
broad power over immigration law and refugee resettlement.
Litigation efforts by states to block refugee resettlement have also been futile.
Two particular cases that arose in response to the terrorist attacks in 2015 support
the proposition that, with respect to refugee resettlement, states have little role to
play. The first case, Exodus v. Pence, arose when then governor of Indiana, Mike
Pence declared on November 16, 2015 that he was suspending the resettlement
of Syrian refugees in Indiana.267 Exodus, a VOLAG affiliate, continued to resettle
refugees in Indiana despite the gubernatorial directive.268 In response, the State of
Indiana threatened to withhold the federal grant funds that Exodus would use to
provide resettlement and social services to Syrian refugees.269
Exodus subsequently brought suit against the State of Indiana and requested
a preliminary injunction of the State’s actions citing both equal protection
and Title VI claims.270 The federal district court granted Exodus’s request for a
preliminary injunction, stating that “the State’s withholding of federal funds for
social services provided to Syrian refugees is diametrically opposed to Congress’s
goal of providing services to refugees ‘without regard to . . . nationality.’”271 The

See What Is Your Governor Saying about Syrian Refugees?, Federation for American Immi
Reform, http://www.fairus.org/issue/what-is-your-governor-saying-about-syrian-refugees
(last visited Apr. 14, 2017); Sara Rathod, The Freak-Out Over Syrian Refugees Is Continuing in
These States, Mother Jones (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/02/
anti-Syrian-refugee-legislation-states.
263

gration

264

See generally Rathod, supra note 264.

265

Elias, supra note 14, at 380.

See Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence, 838 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding
that “[a]lthough in the fall of 2015 a number of state governors issued statements opposing the
resettlement of Syrian in their domains, their opposition petered out. Since then Syrian refugees
have been resettled in 40 states (Indiana of course is one of them), and there is no indication that
their absence from the other 10 is attributable to actions by state governments.”); see also Elias, supra
note 14, at 394–95.
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Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence, 165 F. Supp. 3d 718, 726 (S.D. Ind.), aff ’d,
838 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 2016).
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Id. at 728 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(5)).
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court found that the State’s directive, which singled out Syrians, was a national
origin classification, the justification for which must meet strict scrutiny.272
The court held that because “the withholding of funds from Exodus that are
meant to provide social services to Syrian refugees in no way directly, or even
indirectly, promotes the safety of Indiana citizens,” the governmental action was
not narrowly tailored to the goal of safety and failed to withstand a heightened
level of scrutiny.273
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s
grant of a preliminary injunction against the State of Indiana.274 The appellate
court reaffirmed the exclusive federal power over immigration in stating that
“[t]he regulation of immigration to the United States, including by refugees
(people who have fled their homeland, and unable to return because of threat
of persecution seek to relocate in a country in which they’ll be safe), is a federal
responsibility codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act.”275 Importantly,
the Court of Appeals went on to note that the role of states in refugee resettlement
is limited.276 In states that choose not to participate in the formal federal refugee
resettlement program, “the federal government has been authorized to establish
an alternative program, called Wilson/Fish, that distributes federal aid to refugees
in a state without the involvement of the state government.”277 Accordingly, the
Exodus case clearly established that the role of states in refugee resettlement is
limited and should a state like Wyoming choose not to participate, alternative
avenues exist to resettle refugees within a state’s borders.
Refugee resettlement was similarly litigated in the case of Texas Health &
Human Services Commission v. United States.278 In that case, the State of Texas
brought suit against the International Rescue Committee, a federal VOLAG,
seeking to prevent Syrian refugees from resettling in Texas.279 Once again, the
federal district court held that the role of states is limited in refugee resettlement.280
The court noted that the federal government is obligated to consult regularly with
the states and take into account the recommendation of states.281 However, the
court found that the “consultation requirement is ‘not intended to give States

272

Id. at 734–35.

273

Id. at 737–38.

274

Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence, 838 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 2016).
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Id. at 903 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq).
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Id. at 905.
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Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1522(e)(7), 45 C.F.R. § 400.69).

Tex. HHS Comm’n v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 3d 733, 737 (N.D. Tex. 2016), appeal
dismissed (Oct. 11, 2016).
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and localities any veto power over refugee placement decisions, but rather to
ensure their input into the process and to improve their resettlement planning
capacity.’”282 The court dismissed the claim against the VOLAG and the federal
government, reaffirming the position that the federal government maintains
control over refugee resettlement in the states.283
Accordingly, recent litigation has reaffirmed the exclusive federal authority
over immigration. Under a preemption doctrine, courts have concluded that
because immigration is a matter of federal law, states have little power to control
the resettlement of refugees within their borders.284 While the statutory framework
provides for a consultative process between the federal government and the states,
it does not provide a mechanism for states to block resettlement of refugees within
their borders. Congressional and executive efforts amplify states’ voices as well
unsuccessful litigation to assert states’ rights underscore the existing limits of
restrictionist refugee federalism.
As such, the logical conclusion to the refugee resettlement debate in
Wyoming is that if the federal government determines that it would like to
resettle refugees in the State and willing participant VOLAGs are prepared to
undertake the operations of resettlement, there is no current legal mechanism by
which the State could veto such federal action. Indeed, the Wilson Fish program
is designed to allow refugee resettlement in a state without the involvement of
state government.285 One might argue that it is only a matter of time, in the
face of a growing global refugee crisis, until the Office of Health and Human
Services, in cooperation with a VOLAG operating in neighboring states, might
begin to resettle refugees in Wyoming.
Of course, there are a number of impediments to refugee resettlement
moving forward in the absence of state consent. Primarily, the Office of
Refugee Resettlement requires that a VOLAG establish that sufficient resources
exist within a given community before a resettlement program is approved.286
For example, the VOLAG would need to demonstrate that there are sufficient
housing, employment, transportation, and education resources available to
ensure that newly arriving refugees receive the support they need to move
toward self-sufficiency.287 It would be difficult for a VOLAG to meet ORR
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Id. at 745 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-132, at 19 (1985)).

283

Id. at 744.
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Elias, supra note 14, at 401– 02.

See Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence, 838 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1522(e)(7), 45 C.F.R. § 400.69).
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approval without state-level engagement and cooperation in the provision of
these basic governmental services. Moreover, as some commentators have noted,
states can make life difficult for resettled refugees by refusing to cooperate,
restricting funding for health and other services, and creating administrative
hurdles for refugees in the acquisition of state identification and access to statesponsored resources.288
Nonetheless, the legal framework exists to allow the federal government to
forge ahead with refugee resettlement within the State of Wyoming without the
State’s affirmative consent. Indeed, the federal government might consider it the
only equitable way forward in a nation where 49 other states have born a part of
the responsibility in responding to the global refugee crisis. In light of this reality,
it would be prudent for Wyoming to explore the practicality of its one in fifty
exclusionary position in relation to refugee resettlement.

B. Engaging in Collective Action: Cooperative Refugee Resettlement
Given that the federal government has authority to resettle refugees within
Wyoming without the State’s consent, the question then arises: is cooperative
refugee resettlement a better way forward? A discussion of this question benefits
from additional context. Refugees are coming to Wyoming. Even without a
formal refugee resettlement program, the number of refugees within the State
is increasing.289
First, refugees are choosing to move to Wyoming from bordering states.290
Because states do not and cannot control the movement of people between states,
many individuals who have been initially resettled in other states subsequently
make their way to Wyoming.291 This phenomenon is being observed in Cheyenne,
where a number of refugees who work in the meat production industry in Greeley
are moving across the border to make their homes in Wyoming.292 They are drawn
to Wyoming because of its relatively accessible housing options, particularly in
relation to federal housing vouchers for which refugees face a lengthy wait in other
communities and states.293 Yet moving to Wyoming is proving to be a challenge.
As one relocated refugee noted, “Greeley has a system to help new immigrants get
288

Vladeck, supra note 15; see also Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 258.

Lucas High, Somali Refugees Find New Homes in Cheyenne, Wash. Times, May 8, 2014,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/may/8/somali-refugees-find-new-homesin-cheyenne/.
289
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Id.
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Id.
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Miles Bryan, Some On Public Housing Waitlists Are Moving To Get Vouchers, NPR (Oct. 29,
2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/10/29/359892963/some-on-public-housing-waitlists-aremoving-to-get-vouchers.
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services and education. But because the Somali community in Cheyenne is newer,
those services are sometimes harder to find.”294 Public schools, public housing
authorities, and local services providers are struggling to respond to the needs of
a growing refugee population without state-level coordination.295
Second, non-citizens who live in Wyoming, apply for, and are granted
asylum are considered Convention-defined refugees under the Immigration and
Nationality Act.296 When these individuals are granted asylum, they become
eligible for the package of benefits distributed through the Office of Refugee
Resettlement.297 However, at present, when these Wyomingites are admitted
as asylees, they are unable to access the federal benefits and resources to which
they are entitled because of the absence of a refugee resettlement program in
the State.298
Accordingly, refugees are already in the State of Wyoming. Without a state
plan or cooperative refugee resettlement with federal authorities, newly arrived
refugees and those recently granted asylum are unable to access federal resources
to assist in their resettlement and integration in the State of Wyoming.299 In
addition, without formal participation in the federal refugee resettlement
program, the State lacks the broad oversight and coordination that can come from
a more coordinated approach. The concerns highlighted by the sponsors of H.B.
47,300 primarily lack of consultation with Wyoming communities and citizens, are
unaddressed by the status quo. Therefore, a cooperative refugee resettlement plan,
which would enable the distribution of federal grants to qualifying populations
within the State and create a more positive climate for the benefits that flow from
refugee resettlement, seems like a more productive way forward.

294
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Indeed, the federal regulatory scheme provides space and encourages such
“inclusionary”301 or “integrationist”302 law and regulatory frameworks, as
several scholars have described. As previously noted,303 the de facto structure of
the refugee resettlement program imagines an interactive role for the state in
the administration of federal grants.304 Moreover, apart from the de minimus
consultation role for the states, Wyoming stands to create a more successful
refugee resettlement program by exercising its consultative role in a cooperative
spirit with the federal government. Professor Stella Elias suggests state-level
efforts such as “consulting with local communities to see which communities are
interested in hosting refugees, helping the communities prepare for their arrival,
and even identifying refugees from the pool of screened refugees that would be
the best for the community under question.”305 Such efforts, she asserts, “promote
continued inclusion and acceptance of these vulnerable populations . . . .”306
Wyoming has much to gain in actively pursuing cooperative refugee
resettlement with the federal government. The State can receive federal funding to
support those non-citizens who have been granted asylum by the U.S. government
and call Wyoming home. Engagement at the federal level is also more likely to
result in a coordinated approach to secondary refugee migrants who are making
their way to Wyoming.307 The State can pursue its own goals of diversity, safety,
and economic growth in an otherwise down economy308 through engaging in a
consultative process with the federal government and entering into a resettlement
plan.309 Most importantly, Wyoming can join the forty-nine other states in the
United States that have reached out to provide individuals who have been forced
to flee their homes the chance to begin their lives again, safe from the fear of
persecution and harm.

301
Elias, supra note 14 at 409 (“the current statutory scheme does present an opportunity for
‘inclusionary lawmaking’ through using the consultation process to make the refugee resettlement
process to work best for the state.”).

Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 15, at 201 (“More generally, the tide of
restrictionist and enforcement-heavy regulations began to wane in 2012, soon followed by a rising
tide of state-level integrationist laws . . . . The constitutional and statutory leeway for these proimmigrant state and local enactments is broad, as many are either agnostic to immigration status or
are in line with federal statutory authority.”)
302

303
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VI. Conclusion
To date, Wyoming is the only state in the country that has not affirmatively
participated in the federal refugee resettlement program. This article explored
the legal framework that underlies refugee resettlement and the options that
Wyoming has for welcoming refugees within its borders. In addition, it has
outlined the process of refugee resettlement and followed the journey a refugee
makes from displacement in a third country to resettlement in a new community
in the United States.
In tracing the historical trajectory of the refugee resettlement debate
in Wyoming, the article has identified some of the arguments that have been
presented in opposition to resettlement within the State. It has also highlighted a
particular form of “exclusionary” rulemaking particular to the refugee resettlement
discussion in Wyoming. From this foundation, the article has analyzed the extent
to which the federal government’s exclusive power over immigration and the
existing refugee resettlement framework trumps sub-national attempts to veto the
resettlement of refugees at the state-level.
In concluding that the federal government has the power to place refugees
within a state without affirmative state consent, the article has proposed that it is
in Wyoming’s best interest to engage in cooperative refugee resettlement with the
federal government. Through cooperative refugee federalism, Wyoming stands
to benefit economically, socially, and demographically as it joins the forty-nine
other states that have provided safe-haven to those who are forced to begin their
lives again.
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